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The Spatial Dimensions of State-Building 
Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler 
INTRODUCTION 
Why do certain states form and others fail to do so? This chapter illustrates how a spatial 
approach to state-building casts light on the material and symbolic dimensions of state-
building. It will help understand the reasons for which a state like Kosovo ended up being 
widely recognised, both internationally and domestically, while Republika Srpska (RS), one 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s (BiH) entities, has never completed this process despite its strong 
ambitions to do so. Based on our earlier work on spatial transformation and agency 
(Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017), we suggest that state-building practices can be subdivided 
into material categories (place-making) and political-symbolic practices (space-making). Only 
when a newly emerged state combines place-making and space-making can it successfully act 
as a new state. In this chapter, we argue that, whilst Kosovo and RS have both acquired a 
material territory through their state-building ambitions, only Kosovo has managed to obtain 
the necessary political and symbolic resources for it to become an independent state. It has 
acquired recognition at the domestic and international scale, whereas RS primarily enjoys 
recognition at its domestic scale. This chapter does not suggest that successful state-building 
is positive or negative per se, but instead casts light on the interplay between material and 
symbolic spatial conditions of state-building that explain the different possible outcomes in 
the process.  
 
  
 
State-making and self-proclaimed states 
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A sovereign state is not always the outcome of struggles for independent statehood and state-
building processes. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to failed, suspended or 
abandoned state-building attempts. Like successful state formation processes, fledgling states 
have their origins in an idea about the state based on the right of self-determination within a 
territory (Buzan, 1991; Visoka, 2018; Lemay-Hébert, 2009). The emergence of a state 
therefore has a symbolic (self-determination and recognition) as well as a material (territory) 
dimension. Sometimes, statehood is claimed based on ethnicity or nationality and performed 
through independence or secessionist movements’ vision of a ‘homeland’ (Billing, 1995). 
Once territorial control and state-like institutions are achieved, de facto independence may be 
claimed. Since these self-proclaimed states often are born out of violent struggles, they are 
seen to violate the principle of territorial integrity of the established state and are thus rarely 
internationally recognized. The lack of recognition means that the state in the making is in 
limbo, outside the international system of sovereign states (Bartelson, 2001; Bryant, 2014; 
Caspersen, 2012; Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012).  
 
As state-making processes around the world evidence, these processes may not always 
produce sovereign states. Recent research identifies a number of possible outcomes of 
unfinished, interrupted or stalled state-making processes and suggest that even some 
suspended or abandoned processes may result in a state-like entity (Kuftinec 1998: 85; 
Stjepanović 2015). A variety of concepts is available to describe these entities; de facto states, 
para-states, statelet, unrecognized states, pseudo-states and quasi-states (cf. Kolstø 2006).  
 
The concept of ‘de facto states’ has been used by a number of scholars to characterize polities 
that have achieved de facto independence including territorial control and have managed to 
maintain this for some time. They function as a state and may be recognized as such by their 
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population, but are unrecognized by the international community of states. Anthropologist 
Rebecca Bryant (2014: 126) points us towards ‘liminality’ as a key feature of de facto states. 
Liminality describes transitional periods or phases and it is often used to analyse thresholds in 
rites of passage towards statehood. Unrecognized de facto states are described as 
“permanently liminal”, a status which shapes their ambiguous statehood and puts them in a 
“precariously unstable situation” (Bryant, 2014: 126, 138). In this, RS and Kosovo have been 
analysed as holding fragmented or ethnic sovereignty, and as such have failed to gain full 
international recognition (Fawn and Richmond, 2009). Unrecognized statehood points at 
states that strive for international recognition and membership in the international community 
of states (Caspersen, 2012). Recent research on international recognition by Edward Newman 
and Gëzim Visoka (2016) demonstrates the agency of fledgling states as well as the hybrid 
justifications behind recognition of statehood and independence. In contrast, the notion of 
quasi-states refers to a state that only possesses external sovereignty and that can exist 
because of international recognition, and not because it controls its territory or provides for its 
citizens (Jackson, 1991).  
 
By critically excavating polities with internal sovereignty, referring to entities recognized by 
its population as a state and performing as a state, it is possible to unpack the concept of the 
state to reveal the multi-layered and fluid nature of its construction in order to attempt to 
understand under which conditions it successfully represents itself as coherent and singular 
(Gupta 1995). James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002) as well as Aradana Sharma and Akhil 
Gupta (2006) explore the social processes through which state ideas are reproduced. With the 
rise of the nation-state, the idea of the state came to rest on the nation and the idea of national 
self-determination. It links rights of nations to the notion of self-determination and the rights 
of states to questions of sovereignty (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). Following from this idea of the 
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nation-state, state-making is becoming a struggle to represent and emplace the nation within 
the borders of a sovereign state. 
The physical territory of the two case studies for this chapter, Kosovo and Republika Srpska, 
emerged as a result of the breakup of Yugoslavia in which one bigger state-level unit was 
broken down into smaller entities. This process can also be said to have been accompanied by 
the collapse of Tito’s idea of ‘brotherhood and unity’, which had served as a centripetal force 
in Yugoslavia. Kosovo was initially part of Serbia, but had held a degree of formal autonomy. 
RS emerged as a result of the ethnically segregated outcomes of the Dayton Peace Accords, 
which sought to gain the agreement of all warring sides by granting them their own territory. 
The territory of the RS was therefore established in dialogue with the international actors who 
had facilitated the agreement and, with it, the decentralised constitution of BiH. It was one 
way to use the state to end the violence and organise the country in spatial terms once the war 
had ended (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005). This was linked to the ethnic segregation of BiH, 
coupled with the displacement and migration of people who now predominantly live in 
ethnically homogeneous areas.  
 
SPATIALIZING THE STATE 
There are different ways in which the state is spatialized and how a population comes to 
imagine the space as a formal state with certain spatial properties. The spatialization of the 
state refers here to the spatial and material forms that ideas and practices take on in state-
building processes (cf. Björkdahl and Buckley- Zistel, 2016). It is about the emplacing the 
idea and the practices of the state through a fusion of ideational and material properties. 
Contestations and conflict over space and place may create new spatial arrangements. This 
results in a new way of ordering space, gives rise to new ideational and territorial landscapes 
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and emplaces a given idea of the state (Campbell, 1998; Kliot and Mansfield, 1997). Thus, the 
state is understood to be both material and territorial as well as imagined and ideational. It is 
emplaced, constituted and populated by the way people experience its ideational and material 
forms (Björkdahl, 2018).  
However, spatialization is a fluid process as it is constitutive of and constituted by peoples' 
continued belief in the idea of the state and the actualizations of certain spatial orders such as 
the state. “‘Placing’ the ethnic or national community in ‘its’ territory, physically and 
symbolically, is inseparable from the process of the bounding of the nation and of the making 
of the state” (Kostovicova, 2004: 270). It forges “the mystic bond between people and place”, 
i.e. between nation and homeland. Such work is particularly intense during state-building 
processes, according to Smith (cited in Kostovicova, 2004: 270). Thus, the state becomes a 
means of institutionalizing the link between identity and territory.  
Based on these insights, we suggest that a state emerges through two fundamental 
geographical processes: place-making on the one hand, and space-making on the other hand 
(cf. Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). We understand ‘place’ as a material, physical and bounded 
entity, a location. It represents the territory that a state needs to govern a peace within its 
boundaries. Space, instead refers to the ideational, symbolic counter-part of place, its 
relational qualities and the meanings associated with it. Indeed, a state needs a repertoire of 
symbols in order to function in our global system – not only a flag and an anthem, but also the 
recognition of its citizens and the international community. The processes of place-making 
and space-making are thus not the same, but have to take place jointly if a new state is to 
emerge. 
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Scaling place-making and space-making 
Place-making and space-making are processes that are not limited to the scale of the nation-
state, but reach across different scales of analysis. They take place in the interplay of local, 
national and international actors.  
 
In this context, in the bulk of work on scalar politics, most attention has been given to the 
social construction of spatial scales as a way of governing. A lot of this work has referred to 
the global capitalist economy as a sphere in which spatial hierarchies are created, with an 
underlying assumption that the scale of the ‘global’ is superior to that of the ‘national’ and 
‘local’ (Sassen, 2000: 226). It has been acknowledged that the establishment of scales in itself 
is a political process (Brenner, 1998: 460) and “imbued with power” (McCann, 2003: 160). If 
we take this for granted, then we have to acknowledge that our scalar understanding of 
politics, that is, at what geographical level politics take place, is fundamentally instrumental. 
It reflects assumptions about which scale is best suited for the implementation of particular 
policies (McCann, 2003: 163) as well as about the types of actors who have the right to 
reshape and transform a place (McCann, 2003: 172).  
 
In that sense, following Swyngedouw (2000), the choice of scale, the attempt to rescale 
politics from one level to another, and the resistance against this process, can all be 
considered spatial expressions of power (p.67, 70). Brenner (1998: 473) derives the need for a 
fixation of scales from the divisions inherent in the global economy and associated imperial 
practices. This is certainly not to say that scales are natural givens in terms of where politics 
can best take place. Much in contrast, scalar categories are a matter of representation and thus 
power (Cox, 1998: 43). When it comes to state-building practices, we can observe a strategic 
interplay between local, national and international dynamics and actors. Which scale is 
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dominant depends on the given case as well as point in time. Different actors at various scales 
of governance mobilise and inhibit each other, depending on the desired outcome of their 
state-building ambitions. Geographical places to host a state can be created locally of 
internationally and often in the mutual support of specific domestic and international actors, 
as the case of Kosovo and its internationally-managed state-building process clearly 
demonstrates. It is the very interplay between scales of actors and policy makers that helps us 
understand, in a geographical sense, how mechanisms of state-building are initiated, sustained 
and resisted at different levels of agency.      
 
PLACE-MAKING AS A MEANS OF STATE-BUILDING 
Place-making is the process through which a material presence is given to an idea (Björkdahl 
and Kappler, 2017). In the context of state-building, this is materialised in the establishment 
of a given territory on which a state can emerge, i.e. the materialization of the idea of the 
state.   
A place is not neutral, but reflects power. A homeland may become an arena where a 
dominant nation may enforce its vision, but also a ground for the contestation of that vision 
(Tuan, 1976: 35). Thus, the state is understood as territorial and it is emplaced and constituted 
and populated by the way people experience the place.  
 
Republika Srpska 
Already in 1990, the wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić revealed the emergent 
ethnoterritorial idea of BiH held by SDS, the Serbian ethno-nationalist party. Karadžić, a 
renewal nationalist, was elected leader of the Bosnian-Serb ultranationalist party (SDS) 
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because of his powerful oratory, and he came to be one of the founding fathers of RS. 
Following the refusal of Serb politicians in BiH to endorse the referendum on the 
independence of BiH, Karadžić spoke to the secessionist parliament set up in Pale and 
declared the independence of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
early 1992 (later renamed RS), stating that BiH no longer existed (Stjepanovic, 2015; 
Woodward, 1995). In the declaration of independence of RS, Karadžić stated his aim to 
control the territory of Eastern Bosnia that he expected to be the material foundation of the 
RS. In his rhetoric, Karadžić portrayed BiH as a land of primordial violence and Serbs as 
perpetual victims of its different empires in order to legitimize the ideas about a Serb 
homeland. Consequently, in the declaration of independence, Karadžić also outlined the 
strategic goals for the army of RS (Toal and Dahlman, 2011). These goals included ethnic 
cleansing and territorial control to make up the Bosnian-Serb state. Through the ethnic 
cleansing of territory, the Bosnian-Serb leadership reinforced their claim to the place. The 
ethnic cleansing was done mainly by paramilitaries1 assisted by the JNA/VRS to secure 
territory for the new Bosnian-Serb state. By removing different ethnic groups from a formerly 
mixed location and by erasing the material and tangible heritage of the other, the past was 
erased and cleared the way for the new state. The RS became rooted in the place as the 
material legacy of the other was demolished and the territory became associated with Serb 
identity. Serbian flags, party symbols, portrays of Bosnian-Serb ethno-nationalist political 
leaders, Serb-Orthodox churches replacing mosques, all came to mark the territory as 
Bosnian-Serb. The place thus became ethnicized and marked as ‘belonging’ to the Bosnian-
Serb community as parts of their historic homeland.  Bosnian-Serb ethno-nationalist political 
elites, their supporters as well as many Bosnian-Serbs in their everyday acted as if RS was an 
                                                 
1 This involved persons and groups such as Vojislav Seselj and his paramilitaries, also known as Seseljvci 
(Seselj's men), Arkan's Tigers under the command of the Serbian criminal Zelko (Arkan) Raznjatovic and Beli 
Orlovi (White Eagles).  
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established, internationally recognized state. The fragile achievements of RS as a ‘state’ relied 
on the repeated performance of its existence, and an ‘ethnic sovereignty’ (Fawn and 
Richmond, 2009) was established. RS was performed through controlling territory, declaring 
independence and establishing a constitutional framework and institutions. RS still continues 
to exist in opposition to and as one part of the Dayton-sanctioned state BiH and an internal 
inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) divides the territory of BiH into two “sub-states” the 
Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 51% of the territory and the 
Bosnian-Serb RS, with 49% of the territory (Toal and Dahlman, 2011).  
 
Kosovo/a 
In contrast, Kosovo2, a region which has historically had a certain degree of autonomy with 
respect to Yugoslavia, saw its autonomy status suspended in 1989. Ambitions for secession 
from Serbia resulted in the outbreak of a violent conflict in the late 1990s and the eventual 
creation of an independent state in 2008. With a Serb minority scattered across Kosovo and 
predominantly in the North, the internationally-supervised state-building process has not been 
without resistance (cf. Jansen, 2000). However, the Kosovar territory could fairly easily be 
delineated from Serbia due to Kosovo’s historical status of autonomy and therefore did not 
come with the same degree of displacement and restructuring as was the case at the creation 
of RS – a more a-historical entity.  
 
From early on, a range of international agencies, particularly American and European, were 
involved in the associated state-building processes. More specifically, Visoka and Richmond 
(2016) suggest that international actors strategically used state-building as a means to respond 
                                                 
2 We refer to Kosovo and Kosova as ‘Kosovo’ in this chapter.  
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to the requests of Kosovo Albanians, whilst resorting to peace-building techniques to 
accommodate the demands of the Kosovo Serb minority.  
 
State-building in Kosovo has therefore been clearly performed and enacted at multiple scales, 
including domestic and international actors. Those actors may have worked in agreement as 
well as disagreement with each other: NATO and UNMIK being primary forces of 
international involvement in Kosovo’s state-building process with an increasing role of the 
EU is contrasted with the Kosovo-Albanian Vetëvendosje! (‘Self-determination!’) party, to 
quote but one example (cf. Vardari-Kessler, 2012). Whilst there is a degree of agreement 
between all of those actors that Kosovo needs to be an internationally recognised state, 
Vetëvendosje! specifically has long campaigned against the foreign presence of state-builders 
in the country itself. The recognition of Kosovo as a physical entity is therefore shared to a 
large degree between those above-mentioned actors, who, however, are in competition with 
each other about the possible ways in which this territorial autonomy can be achieved. These 
varied imaginaries about what state should be built, and how, are not just clashing between 
local and international actors, but can be found between the different minorities of Kosovo as 
well (Sigona, 2012). 
 
Having said that, it becomes obvious that the presence of a territory is an important element 
of state-building and, where this territory is not yet delineated, place-making consists in 
creating a physical territory on which a state can emerge. Different actors operating at 
different scales have their competing needs and demands that any given territory needs to 
fulfil. And whilst place-making needs an available territory, we see both in the case of RS and 
Kosovo a strong international tutelage process through which place is devised, divided up and 
allocated to different groups and agencies in positions of power.  
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SPACE-MAKING AS A MEANS OF STATE-BUILDING 
We have now shown that both Kosovo and RS were successful in creating a place, a material 
base or territory, as a basic precondition of state formation. However, as we shall argue, only 
Kosovo has been able to achieve some degree of multi-scalar sovereignty in terms of 
domestic and international recognition through the process we term ‘space-making’. Space-
making refers to the creation of a symbolic, ideational counter-part of material place-making 
(Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). With respect to state-building, it extends to the creation of 
sovereignty, legitimacy as well as the establishment of domestic and international recognition. 
It reflects the political capital that any given material entity requires in order for it to act as a 
state on the global stage.  
A key dimension of state-building is turning the territory under control into a sovereign state. 
The process of space-making represents the crafting of an idea of the state that resonates with 
domestic, regional and international audiences. Such crafting relies on myths, symbols, 
narratives and is reinforced through processes of ‘acting like a state’ (Visoka, 2018). Thus, 
the physical place, i.e the ‘homeland’, is where the idea and the practice of statehood is 
grounded and then, socially and symbolically emplaced through processes of state-making. 
Republika Srpska 
Among Serb nationalists, the territory of RS has long been regarded as a state for the Serbs 
and claims of sovereignty were derived from the right to self-determination. Such sovereignty 
based on claims to ethnicity is based on a self-constructed “web of meaning” of which 
perceptions of sovereignty is an important part (Fawn and Richmond, 2009: 210). There was 
an ideological reservoir to tap into to construct the idea of a sovereign RS. The space-making 
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process centred around the idea of a new Greater Serbian state, based on Serbdom's ‘historical 
and ethnic borders’ and a romanticisation of the nation (Toal and Dahlman, 2011: 44). 
Furthermore, the power of state symbols, historical narratives and selective remembrance 
were tools that nationalist politicians used prior to, during and after the war in the space-
making process as giving meaning to the Serb ethnic homeland, the material foundation of 
RS. As a visual representation of RS, its flag was frequently used in building the ideational 
foundation of the state. Many Bosnian-Serbs have continued to fly the RS flag outside their 
houses, for example when celebrating the national holiday. The Dan Republike, the ‘entity 
day’, commemorates the establishment of RS on 9 January 1992 and is celebrated every year 
on that day as a sign of pride, despite the celebration of statehood was ruled as 
unconstitutional. The national anthem ‘Bože Pravde’ was seen by both the ethno-nationalist 
elite and its supporters to represent the Serbs in RS as well as in Serbia. Moreover, the 
national flag was a version of the Serbian flag of Serbia, but without the coat of arms 
displayed. Thus, the state symbols of RS connected it with Serbia proper. Epic warfare values 
as well as personal heroism and self-sacrifice dominated historical narratives that were dug up 
before the outbreak of the war in the early 1990s and legitimized the idea of the historical 
correctness of the Serbs’ own nation. Through narratives selectively referring to a particular 
memory, such as crimes committed by Croats relating to the Jasenovac concentration camp 
during World War II, the idea of the RS was also projected it into the past (Stjepanovic, 
2015). These narratives became important to ethnonationalist politicians to ensure the ‘right’ 
understanding of the Serbian history, to assert Serbian national belonging. Thus, these ideas 
held symbolic power and impelled the state-building process forward. The constitution of RS 
reaffirmed the idea of RS as a Serb state, referring to it as the State of Serbs (Stjepanović, 
2015). Article 1 of the Constitution stated that Republika Srpska3 was a “territorially unified, 
                                                 
3 The Constitution of the Republika Srpska was formally approved on the 28th of February 1992. It has been 
amended several times since to comply with the constitutional agreement of the Dayton Peace Accord and the 
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indivisible and inalienable constitutional and legal entity that shall independently perform its 
constitutional, legislative, executive, and judicial functions.”  
In the narrative of ethno-nationalist Serbs, RS was the supreme territorial identity, its very 
name demarcating an ethnic-based homeland. To mark the territory, the names of various 
cities and municipalities falling within its territory were amended by Serb politicians at 
various levels of governance, during and after the war to demonstrate that these were Serb 
cities or municipalities. One example is the renaming of a town called Foča in ethnically 
cleansed South-East part of BiH. After Foča’s non-Serb population was forced to flee or were 
killed, the town was renamed ‘Srbinje’, which means ‘the place of Serbs’. This renaming 
captures the ehnonationalist idea of the Serb state being built purely along ethnic lines 
(Mannergren Selimovic, 2011; Toal and Dahlman, 2011). Serb names for cities and 
municipalities in RS can be seen as a symbolically powerful statement reinforcing the idea of 
the state of RS. Thus, by utilizing the symbolic power of historical narratives of a selected 
past, and by naming the territory ‘RS’, a web of meaning that signifies the space-making 
process helped build domestic recognition for RS. The idea of RS, however, failed to gain 
international support. 
So, despite its claim for right to self-determination and despite control over a particular 
territory, RS failed to secure international recognition and was unable to pass the threshold of 
statehood and until this day it is caught in what can be described as permanent liminality. The 
DPA legalized and legitimated RS not as a state, but as an entity emplaced on the territory 
claimed through large-scale ethnic cleansing (Belloni, 2007). Now RS exists as one part of the 
Dayton-sanctioned state BiH, confirming a de facto spatialization of ethnonationalist state 
ideas (Toal and Dahlman, 2011), yet without creating an internationally-recognised state of its 
                                                                                                                                                        
Constitutional Court of Bosnian and Herzegovina.  
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own. The contemporary discourse in RS is a referenda discourse and the secessionist rhetoric 
of Milorad Dodik, party leader of the SNSD and a key force in RS politics, who constantly 
threatens to hold a referendum on independence keeps the idea of a Bosnian-Serb state alive 
(Toal, 2013; Ker-Lindsay, 2016). 
 
Kosovo/a 
In contrast to RS, Kosovo is now widely recognized as a state. Not only did the leaders of the 
independence movement make claims to a physical territory, but they also kept performing 
the state in different ways (cf. Jeffrey, 2013). Elsewhere, we have written about the labelling 
and marking of the urban space of the capital city Pristina (Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017: 
56ff). Such efforts of engraving the state in a symbolic landscape aim to give it social 
legitimacy by repossessing symbols and claiming heritage for political purposes (cf. 
Björkdahl and Kappler, 2017). In Kosovo, this process was always directed at varied 
audiences. First, the marking primarily of urban spaces serves as a means to consolidate a 
distinct Kosovo-Albanian identity in the state – the featuring of sculptures dedicated to 
Albanian heroes such as Mother Teresa or Skanderbeg is certainly no coincidence (cf. 
Krasniqi, 2013). Second, this serves to send a message to the Kosovar Serbs, most of whom 
are located north of the river Ibar, with some smaller communities still scattered across the 
south, about the nature and control of the ‘newborn’ state – to which there is even an explicit 
statue in Pristina. Third, the language of symbolism is directed at an international audience, 
which had to be able to grant international recognition to Kosovo for its inclusion in a world 
family of states (cf. Caspersen, 2015). Whilst the Republic of Kosovo is not a member of the 
United Nations, primarily due to Russia’s opposition, it is meanwhile a member of various 
other international organisations, including the World Bank and the IMF as well as seeking 
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eventual EU accession. As Jeffrey (2013) suggests, the ways in which states are performed by 
their managers embeds power relations of both control and resistance and relies on scripting 
and improvisation alike. For instance, the resourcefulness that Pristina’s city planners have 
shown to reinvent and reframe the state’s heritage is an indication of a performative practice 
vis-à-vis its different audiences. Such processes certainly face resistance, which a glance to 
the Kosovo-Serb dominated north of Mitrovica shows with its own use of cultural symbolism, 
memorials and political performance. Clearly, the spatial markers of statehood lend 
themselves not only to the cementation of power structures, but equally to possibilities of 
challenging those.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
What our discussion of the spatial dimension of state-building as well as our two chosen case 
studies show is that the processes through which states emerge are firmly rooted in both 
material and symbolic dimensions. State-building is, by its very nature, a spatialising 
operation. Its ever-changing dynamics can therefore be understood in the transformation of 
place (territory) into space (symbolism) and vice versa. Every state needs a material presence 
as much as the necessary performances and symbolic acts that reinforce its legitimacy and 
existence. Coupled together, these processes serve to generate the recognition that they need, 
domestically, regionally and globally. Space-making and place-making must therefore not be 
viewed in isolation, but as two connected processes which emerging states engage in to 
manifest their existence and identity in material and ideational terms. None works without the 
other.  
In that, state recognition has to be seen as multi-scalar, operating at various levels of society, 
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government and international community. The importance of the global and the domestic 
scale, respectively, vary from case to case. Yet, there are always multiple processes of place-
making and space-making at work at different scales. They may operate in mutual 
concordance, or in friction with each other. They might reinforce or oppose each other, and 
actors striving to build a state – at whichever scale they may be operating – have to work with 
actors at different scales in order to achieve their goal.  
However, this is not to say that once statehood has been achieved, it is a completed process. 
Spatially and temporally, statehood always has to be performed and reperformed as it is 
always at risk of being undone or challenged. To this day, Kosovo is seeking universal 
recognition of its status as much as RS is being denied it by the majority of states.  
State-building, in spatial terms, is the recognition of statehood engraved in the physical and 
ideational landscapes of power and control. As much as it can be granted and promoted, it can 
be resisted and challenged – by international, regional or local actors. It is only when a group 
asserts control over both the territory and the symbolism of a state – its place and space – that 
it stands a chance of being recognised as such at its different scales of existence.  
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